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Abstract 
Manufac tur ing firms in Kenya spend an average of 7 .5% of 
their annual sales on bribery, and as much as 14% of the value 
of government contracts on kick-backs. These averages mask 
significant sector, location and size differences in the exposure 
to corruption. Networking with public servants somewhat shields 
firms against corruption but that with politicians deepens exposure. 
Corruption does not fast-track access to public services and 
does not, therefore, play any greasing function. Rather, corruption 
significantly dampens firm growth and the propensity to export, 
implicitly reducing returns to investment and employment. It also 
adds to the cos t of d o i n g bus iness , r e d u c i n g K e n y a ' s 
compet i t iveness and critically undermining the country ' s 
development prospects. These findings uphold others that have 
demonstrated the deleterious consequences of corruption, and 
provide further reason for intensifying the fight against the vice. 
In the circumstance, there is value in exploring ways of dismantling 
bureaucratic discretion and control rights on which corruption 
thrives. Furthermore, sustaining the program of privatisation of 
state corporations and utility companies would create space for 
expanding services, ameliorate capacity restrictions, obviate 
service-stretching, inject competition in the provision of services 
and reduce rents that are the objects of corruption. 
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Introduction 
Surveys of manufacturing firms over the last decade have shown 
that businesspersons in Kenya view corruption as a major hurdle 
to business pursuits.1 Other governance-related surveys have 
also concluded that Kenya is an increasingly corrupt country. 
Recognising this state of affairs, the new government shifted the 
fight against corruption into centre stage soon after coming to 
power, and has legislated accordingly. Unfortunately, the fight 
against corruption has not benefited from hard evidence about 
who is most exposed to corruption and how such exposure is 
structured. Furthermore, there is very little concrete evidence on 
the retrogressive consequences of corruption. Because business 
persons are now more open about the vice, it is possible to gather 
high quality corruption-related data and subject such data to 
rigorous analysis to build the stock of knowledge on which the 
fight against corruption can be founded. This is the primary 
motivation of our paper. 
Two data-related developments are driving current empirical 
analysis on corruption and economic performance namely, the 
availability of country-level corruption indices and rich firm-level 
1 
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data. Analyses based on corruption indices have demonstrated 
conclusively that corruption reduces the investment/GDP ratios 
(Mauro 1995), discourages direct foreign investment (Wei 1997) 
and generally hurts economic growth (Mauro 1995, Wei 1999). 
This type of literature also concludes that corruption skews public 
expenditure away from priority projects to projects susceptible 
to bribery-related manipulations, undermines the productivity of 
public investment and compromises government's ability to collect 
tax revenues (Tanzi and Davoodi 1998). Corruption also creates 
an entry barrier that makes markets less contestable and adds to 
the cost of starting and doing business. Firms that win bids in a 
corrupt environment produce outcomes of connections rather than 
efficiency. Beyond a certain threshold, corruption begets more 
corruption, so that legitimate business investment is discouraged 
(McArthur 2000). It has also been suggested that corruption lowers 
welfare because the cost of corruption adds to the overall cost 
of production (Cooksey et al, 2000). Where corruption abounds, 
consumption falls and poverty is intensified because the poor are 
denied equitable access to social services. 
Although availability of corruption indices permits cross-country 
analysis on the interplay between corruption and economic 
aggregates, concern has been raised about the unobservable 
heterogeneity across data points in cross-country comparisons 
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(Fisman and Svensson 2000). Furthermore, since indices on which 
cross-country analyses are based are constructed from broad 
subjective assessments, they are fraught with perception biases. 
Additionally, cross-country comparisons do not generate 
information on the micro-implications of corruption and take the 
production structure of firms as given. They are also faulted for 
failing to distinguish between different levels and forms of 
corruption (McArthur 2000). 
These shortcomings have been somewhat addressed in works 
that exploit firm-level data to lay a firmer foundation for 
understanding the interplay between corruption and firm 
performance. Building on theoretical frameworks that perceive 
corrupt bureaucrats as maximizers of bribery subject to the 
possibility that they may either be caught or that bribe extraction 
may force firms out of business (Fisman and Svensson 2000; 
Svensson 2000; McArthur 2000), firm-level analysis has 
demonstrated that firms typically pay bribes when dealing with 
public servants especially in the course of exporting, importing, 
and acquisition of infrastructure services and that amounts paid 
depend on the firm's ability to pay (Svenssion 2000), that corruption 
reduces the short-run growth rates of firms (Fisman & Svensson 
2000) and that while broad levels of corruption do not affect 
firm-level performance, corruption in public service provision 
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reduces firm-level productivity and distorts the pattern of 
accumulation of capital (McArthur 2000). 
However, many firm-level surveys often mop-up firms in different 
activities so that technology-related heterogeneity is likely to 
persist and probably lead to wrong conclusions. This paper 
somewhat refines and extends the analysis on corruption and 
firm behaviour by; (a) focusing specifically on manufacturing 
firms to obviate some of the heterogeneity problems, (b) using 
data that pools information from firms of different sizes, (c) 
exploit ing a richer idiosyncratic dimension of a recent 
manufacturing survey, and (d) expanding the set of firm 
performance indicators to include export performance. 
We use the Investment Climate Assessment survey data for 
Kenya gathered by the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research 
and Analysis in collaboration with the Regional Program for 
Enterprise Development (RPED) of the World Bank during 
March - July 2003. A random sample developed on the basis of 
census data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) was 
used. 
The sample frame was an outcome of several steps. First, a list 
of registered manufacturing firms was compiled by the Central 
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Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Ministry of Planning and National 
Development. Some firms were deleted from the list after 
controlling for location and sector. This frame was stratified on 
the basis of size, location and sub-sector. To adequately reflect 
geographical distribution, five regions were defined including 
Nairobi Area that extended to the environs of the city, Mombasa, 
Nakuru, Eldoret and Kisumu. To obtain appropriate distribution 
of manufacturing activities, the ISIC classification was used to 
define nine distinct activities that included Agro-industry, 
Chemicals and Paints, Construction Materials, Furniture, Metals, 
Paper, Publishing and Printing Industry, Plastics, Textile and 
Leather Products and Wood. 
In line with other RPED data sets, five size classes were 
identified, namely; Very Small (1-10 employees), Small (11-49 
employees), Medium (50-99 employees), Large (100-499 
employees) and Very Large (500 or more employees). The 
location, size and sectors of activities were used to define clusters, 
out of which firms were random selected. Owing to numerous 
refusals, the actual number of firms interviewed was 282 from a 
sample of 368 listed firms. Data massaging further reduced the 
working sample to 279 firms. 
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The survey ins t rument had eight modules , namely; 
Entrepreneurship and Business History, Technology, Trade, 
Infrastructure, Business Environment, Production and Sales, 
Credit and Finance, Labour and Training. The business 
environment module included questions that generated 
information on corruption as indicated below: 
a. In 2002, what would you estimate as the total amount 
spent by a typical establishment in your industry in 
'unofficial payments' for public utilities, telephones 
and licences from public institutions including the 
central government? 
b. What about for licenses from government institutions? 
c. How about unofficial payment in respect of other 
services? 
d. How much do you estimate unofficial payments are 
as a percentage of annual revenue for a typical firm 
in your industry? 
e. When establishments in you industry do business with 
the government or local authorities, what percentage 
of the contract value is typically expected in gifts or 
unofficial payments to secure the contract? 
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Often, concern is raised about whether reliable data on corruption 
can be collected in spite of the inclusion of these carefully crafted 
questions in the survey instrument, and given the secretive nature 
of corrupt activities (Fisman and Svensson 2000). We believe 
that in our case, this concern was mitigated through a variety of 
data collection strategies. Previous RPED surveys had already 
introduced Kenyan manufacturers to discussion on corruption 
and managers appear progressively willing to discuss corruption 
issues with unusual forthrightness. The information collection 
strategy had also other strengths that increased the reliability of 
the corruption data. 
First, the survey was implemented by Kenya Institute of Public 
Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), a semi-autonomous 
think-tank with a good rapport with Kenya's private sector.2 
Implementation of the survey by KIPPRA meant that the survey 
was conducted by an organisation that the private sector could 
trust. 
Second, questions on the general business environment, of which 
corruption related questions were a part, were strategically placed 
in the questionnaire, so that there was enough of other less-
sensitive questions to improve rapport with the respondents before 
posing corruption questions. Third, multiple questions on corruption 
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were asked to improve on the reliability and lastly, the questions 
were posed indirectly to avoid implicating the respondent of any 
wrongdoing. 
In Section 2 we review some of the recent l i terature on 
corruption, and then turn to the sample characteristics and locus 
of corruption in Section 3. In Section 4 we explore the structure 
of corruption before finding out the specific impact of corruption 
on firm growth and export propensity in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
A Review of Corruption Literature 
Shleifer and Vishany (1993) define corruption as the sale of 
government property by public officials for personal gain. 
Corruption can be either petty or systemic. It is petty when honesty 
is the norm so that corrupt acts are exceptional and dishonest 
officials invariably punished when detected. On the other hand, 
corruption is systemic when it involves a large pool of individuals 
who habitually and cooperatively engage in dishonest acts. Social 
sanctions against corruption diminish as corruption becomes 
increasingly systemic since honest individuals become exceptions 
and find it increasingly hard to do honest business, phantom firms 
are established for purposes of corrupt deals, and reputation 
matters increasingly less. 
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Models explaining interactions between entrepreneurs and 
bureaucrats range from the 'invisible hand' that assumes relatively 
benevolent, well organised and un-corrupt governments to the 
'grabbing-hand' that views governments as disorganised, 
interventionist and corrupt (Frye & Shleifer 1997). In between, 
we encounter the 'helping hand' model that assumes intimate 
involvement of public servants in promoting private economic 
activity through selective pursuit of unified industrial policies. The 
'grabbing hand' model, often validated in situations characterised 
by a large bureaucracy of independent public servants pursuing 
private interest without concern over unified policy stances, 
describes the environment in which corruption best thrives. 
The 'principle agent' and 'crime and punishment' models typically 
inform the analysis of determinants of corruption. On the crime 
side, a public servant is assumed to compare expected utilities 
from legal and illegal behaviour. On the punishment side, the 
probabilities of detection and punishment are put into consideration 
in comparing expected utilities. This crime-punishment model 
concludes that the incidence of illegal behaviour such as corruption 
is positively correlated with the gains from illegal activity, and 
negatively related with the probability of detection and punishment. 
The principal-agent model on the other hand regards corruption 
as an information problem, with a principal who is unable to control 
9 
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an agent properly.3 Monopoly powers and discretion enjoyed by 
public officials create information barriers that are then exploited 
by corrupt public servants. 
Corruption can either include or exclude theft. Corruption without 
theft occurs when public servants turn over the entire official 
proceeds from sale of public service or good to government, 
keeping the bribe component only. On the other hand, bribery 
includes theft when public servants conceal the transaction 
altogether, passing nothing to the government. With theft, a firm 
pays an amount equal to the bribe, often lower than the official 
price (Schleifer & Vishny 1993, Bardan 1997). Successful 
extraction of bribe with theft requires public servants to create 
artificial shortages or stretch services. Since the price charged is 
often lower than the official price, this form of corruption is more 
attractive to firms, promotes collusion between firms and 
bureaucrats and is harder to detect and control. By aligning the 
interests of firms with those of public servants, corruption with 
theft tends to become more generalised (Shleifer & Vishny 1993). 
Corruption is also either cost-reducing or surplus-shifting (Bliss 
& Di Telia 1997), the former occurring when corrupt agents reduce 
the costs of acquiring a public service and demand a bribe in 
return. Surplus-shifting bribery is extracted when market 
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surpluses known to corrupt bureaucrats are targeted. Corrupt 
bureaucrats and their business counterparts find cost-reducing 
corruption mutually beneficial even though theft is invariably 
involved. 
Extraction of a bribe derives from bureaucratic discretion over 
firms. Bureaucratic control rights are outcomes of the regulatory 
environment. When business operations are subject to either 
multiple licences or subsidies, the regularity of contact between 
entrepreneurs and bureaucrats increases. Where issuance of 
licences or decisions about whom to offer subsidies is at the 
discretion of a bureaucrat, corruption opportunities arise. Whether 
or not these opportunities are exploited depends on the quality of 
the public servants that is in-turn closely associated with the criteria 
for recruitment and promotion, the level of public sector 
remunerations relative to those in the private and NGO sectors, 
and the strength of prevailing moral norms (Wei 1999; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993). 
Corruption contracts can also be viewed as sequential games 
that involve arbitrary and uncertain property rights. Corrupt agents 
initially look out for their likes on the other side of the transaction 
divide. The probability for this desirable double coincidence is 
assessed in every transaction and revised upwards after 
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successful bribe-extraction attempts. Such success encourages 
initiation of corruption in subsequent transactions (Bardan 1997). 
Since being reported and sacked is always a possibility, corruption 
is a gamble. It is also a frequency-dependant game whose 
expected gains depend on the number of other corrupt agents 
involved. The expected cost of corruption declines with the 
number of corrupt bureaucrats and the profitability of corruption 
positively correlates with its frequency (Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny 
1993). 
The efficacy of bureaucratic control rights on which corruption 
thrives varies across sectors and locations depending on regularity 
and intensity of contact. Exporting firms and those that use 
imported raw materials often require additional licences and end 
up dealing with more public servants and government agencies 
(Svensson 2000). They are therefore more prone to bureaucratic 
control on this account. Since informal and small firms seldom 
deal with bureaucrats, bureaucratic control rights over such firms 
are weak.4 A similar difference can be assumed between firms 
located in capital cities where bureaucrats concentrate and those 
located in smaller cities. Other sector-specific factors that dispose 
firms to corruption include dependence on public infrastructure 
services (Fisman & Svensson, 2000). 
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The probability that a randomly selected firm is exposed to 
corruption is simply the probability that such a firm is matched 
with a corrupt bureaucrat. Whether the firm ultimately pays bribes 
is the outcome of a bargaining process that depends on the relative 
leverage that each party enjoys, as well as on the corrupt 
bureaucrat's bribe-extraction talents (Svensson 2000; Fisman & 
Svensson 2000). Firms are poorly leveraged from bribe extraction 
when a large proportion of their investment is irreversible so that 
exit is costly. Underlying technology therefore counts (Fisman & 
Svensson 2000). The danger that firms may be forced to exit act 
as primary deterrence against corruption. 
Bureaucratic heterogeneity and competition among corrupt 
bureaucrats also increase a firm's leverage. The presence of 
even a few honest bureaucrats encourages re-application for 
licenses and utility connections, reduces possibilities for 
customising corruption-related harassment, and increases the 
likelihood of exposing corrupt practices. When corrupt public 
servants act independently, they undermine each other and in the 
extreme case of free entry into bribe collection, total bribes 
demanded from each firm simply explode and production collapses. 
Therefore, the very industrial organisation of corruption 
determines it future (Shleifer & Vishny 1993). 
13 
IDS Working Paper No. 541 
The degree of control rights can be viewed as determining the 
threat point or leverage in 'negotiating' between public servants 
and firms. When public servants have low control rights, firms 
can refuse to pay the bribe without any major consequences on 
their operations. Where bureaucrats have high control rights, firms 
either pay the required bribe or are forced to exit. Control rights 
vary across location and sector, but are typically high for exporting 
firms because such firms often require additional licenses and 
deal with more government agencies and/or departments. They 
are also high for larger firms that, for reasons of size, tend to be 
obtnisive and bound to attract attention from public servants. On 
the other hand, control rights are low for informal firms that seldom 
deal with bureaucrats and for very small firms that are by 
implication less obtrusive. 
There are also demand side considerations. Bribes extracted by 
employees of utilities are lower when capacity restrictions are 
ameliorated, such as when a utility parastatal is privatised (Clerk 
and Xu 2002). This is because of a reduction in excess demand 
and limited opportunities for service stretching following, for 
example, privatisation-related capacity expansion. Privatisation 
gives a utility company better property rights as private owners 
become residual claimants of the company's income, and the 
incentive to reduce corruption increases. Under public ownership, 
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individuals have little incentive for monitoring employees. 
Privatisation increases the marginal benefit of monitoring without 
a corresponding increase in marginal costs. Principal-agent 
problems between owners and managers that may be more acute 
under public ownership become ameliorated through privatisation. 
When side payments from corrupt employees are possible, 
managers are unlikely to exert effort in reducing corruption. In 
countries where public sector salaries have been eroded by 
inflation and salary freezes, the threat to fire corrupt public 
employees lacks sufficient moral credibility. 
Where there is sufficient competition, such as with multiple utility 
providers, demand for bribes can cause customers to switch to 
other providers. Competition therefore leverages customers. On 
the other hand, enterprises that are more profitable pay higher 
bribes in accordance to the endogenous harassment and queuing 
theories of corruption. According to the endogenous harassment 
theory (Kaufmann and Wei 1999), a service provider may have 
observable information that helps estimate a firm's maximum 
willingness to pay for a service and then endogenously request 
bribes accordingly. In this case the bribe amount expected from 
different firms increase with the willingness to pay for the service. 
15 
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In the endogenous harassment framework, the employees of the 
service provider discriminate between different service users on 
the basis of characteristics instrumental in the willingness to pay. 
Under the queuing or speed money hypothesis, enterprises self-
select the amount of bribe depending on the cost of waiting. Under 
the endogenous harassment hypothesis on the other hand, 
employees of a utility provider taking a bribe discriminate between 
enterprises on the basis of information about profitability and other 
characteristics of the firms. 
Other factors related to the endogenous harassment hypothesis 
are that an enterprise's willingness to bribe is a function of the 
magnitude of overdue payments to a utility company or tax 
authorities. When the overdue amounts are significant, the public 
servants threat to either cut the service supply or take legal action 
is credible: the enterprise's fall back position is weakened, and 
the public servant is better able to extract a higher bribe than 
when the enterprise has no outstanding payments. 
The environment in which enterprises and public servants operate 
has also a bearing on the inclination to offer or take a bribe, as 
well as the actual size of the bribe (Clarke and Xu 2002). This is 
on account of the multiple equilibria nature of corruption. The 
urge for an individual to be corrupt is stronger where many people 
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are corrupt. This is because the moral cost of being corrupt is 
low when a society is already corrupt. Since corruption tends to 
undermine economic performance, enforcement resources also 
tend to be limited in corrupt societies, and detection and punishment 
less likely with systemic corruption. 
There are reasons why the overall corruption in a country can be 
high. Rents are higher in less competitive economies, so that 
corruption is by implication higher in such countries. Overall 
corruption is also higher when firms are protected from foreign 
competition by either policy induced barriers or natural barriers. 
Corruption is also higher where there are no political institutions 
for highlighting accountability, such as the lack of democracy 
and free press. Corruption is also higher in countries that are not 
growing rapidly so that occupational choice is affected by the 
system of rewarding talent. With slow economic growth, talents 
tend to flow towards rent seeking sectors rather than productive 
ones. The converse is also true: when an economy is growing 
fast, talent tends to flow in the direction of productive sectors. 
Overall corruption is therefore likely to be greater in countries 
that are either stagnating or growing only slowly. 
From this literature, we expect to find evidence of systemic 
corruption and payment of high bribes. We also expect the 
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incidence and sizes of bribery to functions of the firm profitability, 
irreversibility/opportunity cost of capital, firm size and the 
incidence of red-tape. We also anticipate location and sector 
factors on the structure of corruption. 
Burden and Locus of Firm-Level Corruption in Kenya 
There was a surprisingly high response rate on corruption-related 
questions. The entire sample of 279 firms responded to the 
question about the level of unofficial payments made in respect 
of public utilities (BRIBE 1). 215 of the firms were also able to 
estimate the percent of annual revenue that went to unofficial 
payments (BRIBE). Some 197 of them also gave an estimate of 
the unofficial payments made in respect of business licenses 
(BRIBE2). However, only 140 of the firms responded to the 
question about the percentage of contract value made as unofficial 
payment on government contracts (BRIBECON). This is 
reasonable, since some of the firms in our sample are not likely 
to have received contracts with government on account of small 
size and line of activity.. 
Preliminary analysis reveals that firms spent an average of about 
7.5 percent of their annual sales on bribery. This average is 
however subject to considerable sector and location variations. 
For example, firms in the 'machinery and other' sector bare the 
18 
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greatest burden, with more than 20.4% of their annual revenue 
being spent on such payments (Table 1). Firms in the wood and 
furniture sector were also badly affected as they also spent nearly 
13% of revenue on unofficial payments. Firms in these two sectors 
contrast with those in agro-processing and chemicals/paints 
sectors, that spent only 1.1% and 1.12% of their annual revenue 
on corruption related payments respectively. Regarding kick-
backs in respect of government contracts, firms pay 14.2% on 
average for such contracts. Firms in the construction sector pay 
a whooping 26% as kick-backs on such contracts while those in 
paper, printing and publishing firms pay as much as 25.8% of the 
contract value in kick-backs. Other firms that were also heavily 
burdened by contract related kick-backs were those in textile/ 
garment, metals sector and those in the wood/furniture sectors. 
These pay 14%, 13% and 12% respectively. 
With regard to public services, business licenses attract higher 
bribery than utilities. The mean bribery paid for utilities in 2002 
was Ksh36,948.00. This compares with a sample mean of 
Ksh44,219.00 for business licenses. Obviously, these means mask 
huge sub-sector differences in the burden of unofficial payment 
related to utilities and business licenses. Regarding the latter, actual 
amounts spent by firms during 2002 ranged from Ksh7,400.00 
for firms in the construction-materials 
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sector to an average of Ksh 156,317.00 paid by firms in the textile 
and garments sub-sector. Similarly, unofficial payments in respect 
of utilities ranged from only Kshs8,500.00 for construction 
material sector to Ksh449,000 for paper, printing and publishing. 
On average, senior manager of manufacturing firms spend 13.5% 
of their time dealing with the requirements imposed by government, 
including filling income tax forms, license application and so on. 
This translated into seven working weeks every year. The 
manufacturers are therefore confronted with a high incidence of 
red tape. This may simply be the outcome of bureaucratic stealth 
but on the other hand red tape may be corruption-related, proxying 
for time spent breaking the resolve by businesspersons not to 
oblige. 
During 2002, manufacturing firms in Kenya received an average 
of 21 visits from government officials from different public 
institutions and departments. The highest frequency of visits was 
by personnel from the Kenya Revenue Authority, ostensibly 
related to tax assessments, and the Ministry of Labour and the 
National Social Security Fund. The mean number of visits from 
each of these government departments was five and four 
respectively. Other departments that frequently visited the firms 
were health and municipal authorities. Although there are no 
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known comparative benchmarks, these frequencies and contacts 
between manufacturers and public servants are intense. 
Manufacturing firms also require an average of three business 
licenses. The single business permit and trade licences are most 
common, acquired by 84 and 83 percent of the manufacturing 
firms respectively. Some of the firms also need permits for 
expatriate workers and import licences. On a scale of 1 to 5 
from 'not a problem' to 'severe problem', firms give corruption 
an average rate of 3, so that corruption is viewed as a major 
problem. Although the direct corruption burden appears a small 
proportion of annual sales, it adds to the costs of doing business 
in Kenya, and its indirect consequences are far reaching. 
In terms of location, firms based in the capital city of Nairobi 
bear the brunt of corruption since firms based here pay the highest 
amounts of unofficial payments on most counts. In particular, 
firms based in Nairobi spend the highest proportion of annual 
sales in unofficial payments and the highest average unofficial 
payments for utilities and licenses (Table 3). Firms located in 
Nakuru also pay more than the average percentage of their sales 
in unofficial payments than firms located elsewhere. Obviously, 
there is greater concentration of public servants in Nairobi so 
that the regularity and intensity of contact between public servants 
and firms in greater in the capital city. The results for Nakuru 
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are somewhat perplexing, except that Nakuru, the home city of 
the immediate former President of Kenya has a very complex 
system of patronage that probably translates into a high incidence 
of corruption.5 
There is also a size factor in the locus of corruption. While very 
small firms do not make unofficial payments in respect of licences 
and other services, the medium sized firm are hardest hit by 
corruption and spend as much as 9% of annual sales on corruption 
and 18% of the value of government contracts on kick-backs. 
These percentages are higher than the average for the entire 
sample (Table 4). On the other hand, average unofficial payments 
for utilities and percentage of contract value by the large firms 
are higher than the sample averages. Ironically, the very large 
firms spent the smallest amounts in unofficial payments: they 
spend the smallest proportion of annual sales on unofficial 
payments. This could be a mathematical outcome since equilibrium 
corruption is probably less spread out than firm size. 
To summarise these descriptive analyses, manufacturing firms 
in Kenya spent more than 7% of their total sales on bribery, and 
more about 13% of the value of government contracts as kick-
back. The burden of corruption is therefore not trivial and 
corruption directly adds to the cost of doing business in the 
country. • 
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Table 2: Severity of Corruption by Type and Sector (Figures are arithmetic means) 
Sector 
% annual 
revenue 
going to 
unofficial 
payments 
%of 
contract 
value cut-
out as 
unofficial 
payments 
Unofficial 
payments in 
respect of 
utilities (Ksh) 
Unofficial 
payments in 
respect of 
licenses 
(Ksh) 
Unofficial 
payments 
in respect 
of other 
services 
(Ksh) 
Agro-industries 1.119 13.75 21,330.0 16,800.0 
Bakeries 0.01 6.67 32,000.0 -
Chemicals & paints 1.124 8.57 23,727.0 11,000.0 13,000.0 
Construction material 10.004 26.00 8,500.0 7,400.0 -
Metals 532 13.14 74,125 11363.0 25,500.0 
Paper, printing and publishing 9.172 25.786 449,000.0 24,500.0 -
Plastics 7.01 - 34,000.0 33,615.4 
• « — 
Textile, garments and leather 7.173 14.067 20,795.0 156,357.0 30,000.0 
Wood and furniture 12.703 11.912 60,250.0 2642.9 -
Machinery and other 20.363 - 39,900.0 56,240.0 112,000.0 
Full sample 7.538 14.165 36,948.0 44,219.0 51,714.00 
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Table 3: Severity of Corruption by Firm Size Categories 
Location 
% annual 
revenue 
going to 
unofficial 
payments 
%of 
contract 
value cut-
out as 
unofficial 
payments 
Unofficial 
payments in 
respect of 
utilities (Ksh) 
Unofficial 
payments in 
respect of 
licenses 
(Ksh) 
Unofficial 
payments 
in respect 
of other 
services 
(Ksh) 
Nairobi 937 17.17 53,382.35 92,783 114,153.80 
Mombasa 2.18 11.67 40,800.00 11,857.00 -
Nakuru 17.88 1125 10.463.00 1,640.00 -
Eldoret 0.06 7.69 11,217.40 16,173.31 -
Kisumu - - 8360.00 7,750.00 -
Full sample 7.54 14.16 55,329.10 45,131.00 58,545.45 
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Table 5: Relative Burden of Corruption 
Cost source % of total sales 
Cost of electricity, fuel and other energy 35.84 
Cost of allowances, bonuses and other 
allowances to employees 11.12 
Bribery 7.538 
Loss due to theft, vandalism, and arson 6.12 
Shipment rejected due to damage 0.45 
The Structure of Corruption 
Although businesspersons in Kenya are increasingly open about 
corruption, we expect some response bias that is likely to go in 
either direction. In particular, we expect that there would be firms 
unable to say nothing positive about the political leadership and 
therefore tend to exaggerate the state of corruption. On the other 
hand, it is possible that there would be firms that have benefited 
from official excesses and that are therefore likely to downplay 
the extent of corruption. The firm level data on corruption is 
therefore likely to be noisy just on account of the secretive nature 
of corruption despite the very exacting data collection strategy. 
These considerations are borne in mind in the rest of the paper. 
We now turn to modelling of the structure of corruption. 
Regarding the dependent variable or the variable representing 
corruption, a number of choices are open, such as unofficial 
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payments in respect of public services, unofficial payments in 
respect of business licences, kick-backs associated with 
government contracts, proportion of value of total sales going 
into unofficial payments and even the severity of corruption as a 
problem faced by business persons. We use the percentage of 
annual sales spent on unofficial payments in analysing the structure 
of corruption because this measure is more comprehensive and 
enjoys a high response rate. Although corruption literature has 
been burgeoning, confirmed regularities regarding it structure are 
limited so that econometric analysis of corruption presented below 
has to be treated as experimental. 
We report results of the econometric experiments exploring 
exposure to corruption using the percentages of total sales spend 
on unofficial payments as the dependent variable (Table 6). We 
also cluster some of the explanatory variable around the concepts 
of trade (export participation and use of imported raw materials) 
and networking (measured by number of public servants and 
politicians well known and trusted enough to discuss business 
matters). The explanatory variables also include the proportion 
of tax revenue reported for tax purposes and red tape (measured 
by the proportion of senior managers time used in dealing with 
the requirements of government regulation such as taxes, customs, 
labour regulations, licensing and registration). 
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The results show a strong inverse association between the 
proportion of revenue reported for tax purposes and the 
percentage of annual sales spent on unofficial payments. In other 
words, firms that report a smaller proportion of their revenue for 
tax purposes are more exposed to corruption, upholding the 
endogenous harassment hypothesis that firms that do not pay or 
only meet part of their statutory obligations have poor leveraging. 
The benefits of failure to fully meet statutory obligations are 
eroded by higher corruption-related vulnerability. The results on 
the trade variables suggest that exporting even a proportion of 
finished products and using imported raw materials significantly 
reduces a firm's exposure to corruption. This outcome is counter 
intuitive considering more exacting documentation requirements 
for international trade that in turn lead to greater interaction with 
the bureaucracy and greater exposure to corruption on that 
account. 
The results further reveal that an inverse relationship between 
the number of public servants known and trusted and proportion 
of annual sales spent on unofficial payment. That with politician 
known and trusted is significantly positive. This outcome is 
particularly significant when the two network variables are 
included in the same model. Of particular significance is the finding 
that exposure to corruption increases with the number of politician 
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that proprietors of manufacturing firms know and trust. Fund 
raising activities (popularly known as harambees) are possible 
conduit for such unofficial expenditures that are made in 
exchange for potential favours including access to government 
business. On the other hand, the numbers of civil servants that 
are known by businesspersons show a reverse effect on the 
proportion of total sales spent of unofficial payments. Interactions 
with public servants seem to reduce exposure to corruption. It 
would seem that manufacturers in Kenya find it necessary to 
invest in building acquaintances and developing mutual trust with 
public servants to shield themselves against the unfavourable social 
infrastructure that is part of the Kenyan business environment. 
There is also a strong direct relationship between red tape and 
exposure to corruption, suggesting that paying bribery does not 
in any way reduce the amount of time that senior managers of 
manufacturing firms spend dealing with the requirements of 
government regulations. This outcome is robust to model 
specifications, and shatters the speed money or greasing function 
hypothesis of corruption. 
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Firm Growth, Export Propensity and Corruption 
What does the exposure to corruption imply for firm performance? 
We investigate this relationship by estimating simple models of 
firm growth and export propensity. 
Possibilities of a response bias raised earlier mean that there are 
two basic econometric problems confronting attempts to track 
the effects of corruption on firm performance. The first is 
occasioned by measurement errors or noise in the data and the 
second is the possibilities of joint determination between corruption 
and measures of firm performance. To solve the problem of 
measurement errors, we follow Fisman and Svensson (2000) who, 
following others, used group averages of corruption data as 
instruments for corruption. Specifically, we use sector-location 
averages as instruments. Since noise in the data can be considered 
idiosyncratic to the firm and therefore uncorrelated with general 
measures of bribery, these instruments should mitigate the effects 
of errors in measurement. 
There are two sides to the joint-determination or endogeneity 
problem. When public servants can make bribery related 
harassment specific to each firm (or customise such harassment), 
the equilibrium bribe dependents on the firm's willingness or ability 
to pay. This means that any two firms in the same sector and 
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location could pay different amounts in bribes, and the difference 
may closely correlate with features that also influence the 
performance of firms. Secondly, endogeneity may arise where 
firms focus on either efficiency or rent-extraction as a strategy 
for increasing their performance. Some components of bribery 
are likely to be reasonably fixed across particular industries and/ 
or locations. Examples of these may include unofficial costs of 
being connected to public utilities such as water, power supply 
and telephone. Even then, some firms may choose to compete 
on the basis of improved productivity and new technology, while 
others focus on obtaining important licences and preferential 
market access through under-hand deals. These different 
strategies reduce association between corruption and firm 
performance. Thus important omitted variables would be 
correlated with both corruption and indictors of firm performance, 
so that the corruption coefficient on the firm performance 
measure would be biased.6 
Perceptions play a role in corruption assessment and should inform 
the econometric strategy used. McArthur (2002) argues that 
respondent's tendency to more or less complain will create a 
perception bias in the data. For example, respondents may be 
'habitual pessimists' more likely to see an economy's weaknesses 
rather than its strengths, or have encountered a corrupt public 
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servant immediately prior to the survey on which account they 
end exaggerating corruption. 
To address these statistical problems, we follow Kuafman and 
Wei (1999) and McArthur (2002) by constructing a variable, 
KISRANI, from the survey question 'I am confident that the 
judicial system will enforce my contractual and property rights in 
business. To what degree do you agree with this statement?' 
(Question 11 section V). KISRANI is constructed by taking 
deviations from the means of the responses to this question, which 
are categorical responses ranging from 1 for 'Fully agree' to 6 
for 'Fully disagree'. The inclusion of KISRANI helps test and 
control for this potential response bias. 
The literature suggests that the growth of firms is subject to 
"Gibrat's law of proportionate effect". By this law, a proportional 
change in firm size is independent of the firm's size and the odds 
for firm growth do not dependent on the original size of a firm. 
The growth of a firm is also viewed as a statistical phenomenon 
that results from the cumulative effects of chance occurrences 
related to a horst of forces that operate independently. An outcome 
of this law is that the growth rates of firms of different sizes 
have the same probability distribution. This also concurs with 
Geroski's (1999) hypothesis that the growth of a firm is erratic 
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and unpredictable. This is because most firms innovate only 
sporadically and only once in a while. The growth of firms mimicks 
these erratic innovations. 
The growth of a firm may also proceed in accordance with the 
Jovanovic hypothesis that postulates an inverse relationship 
between the age of a firm and its growth, with a disproportionate 
growth across cohorts of firms shaped by their age (Varyam & 
Kraybill 1992). This hypothesis assumes randomly distributed 
shocks to cost functions with both time invariant and transitory 
components . Because of learning d i f fe ren t ia l s among 
entrepreneurs, this model is important in understanding entry, exit 
or growth of firms. One prediction of the Jovanovic hypothesis is 
that the likelihood for business failure falls with firm age because 
older firms are better able to precisely estimate their true 
efficiencies. There are two important implications of this 
hypothesis. First, the growth rate of surviving firms converges 
with firm age. Second, controlling for firm age, the failure and 
growth rates of surviving firms are negatively related to firm 
size. Where production technology is such that firm output is a 
convex, decreasing function of managerial inefficiency, young 
firms will, according to Jovanovic hypothesis, grow faster than 
older ones. Furthermore, the share of small firms should grow 
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when the birth rate of firms increases. This is because new firms 
tend to start small (You 1995). 
We can also view firm growth through the lenses of the "Penrose 
effect" according to which the management capability of a firm 
puts a limit on its achievements (Penrose 1959). Lack of 
appropriate management has the potential of constraining firm 
growth. Differences in the quality of management therefore partly 
account for differences in the growth prospects of firms. This 
fits neatly with the argument that business persons with better 
managerial capability encourage firm growth while less endowed 
entrepreneurs eventually close down their firms and get absorbed 
as workers in firms with better entrepreneurial abilities. The 
converse is also true: managerially able workers eventually move 
from employment to form businesses (Liedholm & Mead 1991). 
The way entrepreneurs respond to risk sorts them out, with an 
entrepreneurial group emerging from the group of risk takers 
while risk averse individuals become workers (McCormick 1993). 
Risk averse entrepreneurs often prefer meagre but certain returns 
to high but variable ones, or reflect a 'safety first' stance by 
securing pre-determined income thresholds. Rather than desiring 
to grow, some entrepreneurs may be just happy to keep their 
enterprises small (O'Farell 1988; Hitchens, 1988). This state of 
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affairs is more probable when future enterprise goals of owner-
managers are determined by personal life-styles and family 
considerations. Preference for survival rather than growth is more 
appealing when economic independence is the primary objective 
of the entrepreneur. A growth strategy often dilutes property rights 
over a business, so that many owner-managers and partnerships 
may choose to remain small to preserve ownership. Others shun 
firm growth simply because it makes their operations more 
obtrusive and more likely to attract attention from the wrong 
quarters such as competitors and tax authorities. 
Nevertheless, when firms are able to grow, the growth dynamic 
releases their wealth and employment creation potential. Lack 
of such growth is therefore counter-developmental. Enterprises 
that do no grow deny society the developmental outcomes of a 
vibrant private sector, so that failure to grow should attract policy 
attention. 
Exports of manufactures are also important in the expansion of 
industrial production and economic growth (Graner and Isaksson 
2002). This is because such exports encourage competitiveness, 
productivity and firm-growth prospects. Participation in external 
markets permits exploitation of economies of scale that often 
generate domestic spill-over effects related to employment and 
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enhanced use of domestically available materials, encouraging 
downst ream economic activity. Of ten , expor ta t ion of 
manufactures diversifies trade that is important for stabilising an 
economy since exports of manufactures are less prone to trade 
shocks. There are also learning-by-doing benefits since exporting 
firms adopt international best practices. They also receive 
feedback from international competitors and clients. There are 
also knowledge spill-overs that arise from involvement in external 
markets. 
Firms are often better able to improve their product offerings 
when they have an opportunity to interact with foreign clients. 
Because exporters face stiff competition from foreign firms and 
have to satisfy exacting demands from foreign customers, they 
are forced to remain on the lookout for ways of improving product 
quality and production and delivery schedules. For these reasons, 
the benefits that Kenya and its firms can derive from exporting 
are phenomenal. It is for this reason that many export platforms 
were mounted in the last two decades in order to leverage Kenyan 
exports. 
We measure the growth of firm through employment and create 
a growth variable by comparing employment in 2002 and three 
years previously. Our measure of growth is therefore short term 
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and contemporary to other firm-level variables. We then apply 
OLS to estimate extended firm growth functions. Note that 
corruption variables are instrumented by their sector-location 
means to deals with the statistical pathology associated with 
endogeneity as argued earlier. We also include the variable, 
KISRANI, to test and control for perception biases. 
The results (Tables 7) show that corruption, however measured, 
has a deleterious effect on firm growth. Firms that make more 
unofficial payments either as a proportion of total annual sales, 
for utilities, licenses, and a proportion of the value of government 
contracts grow less. We can therefore conclude that corruption 
has a stranglehold on the growth prospects of firms. The results 
also shatter the Jovanovic hypothesis about an inverse relationship 
between firm age and growth, as well as Gilbrat's law that the 
probability that a firm grows does not depend on it original size. 
Manufacturing firms based in Kenya seem to operate within a 
threshold where they have to live long enough to ever grow. 
Similarly, smaller firms seem to grow significantly faster than the 
larger ones as evidence of a catching up process. 
The export propensity results are summarised in Table 8, and 
show that corruption significantly reduces the likelihood for firms 
to export. In other words, firms that are more exposed to 
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corruption find it hard to participate in external markets. This 
finding is robust to different model specifications. We conclude 
that corruption not only stunts firms but also makes them less 
likely to export, denying Kenya the development benefits of firm 
growth and export participation. 
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Table 8: Estimated Export Propensity Functions [Adummy=l for exporting firms is the independent variable] 
Models 
Variables 1 2 3 
% workers using computers 0.0085* 0.0048 0.0033 
[1.797] [1.009] [0.631] 
Use of imported raw material 0.9766* 1.0116* 1.1754* 
[5.406] [5.355] [5.542] 
% annual revenue paid out in bribery -0.0356* -0.0567* -0.0892* 
[-2.167] [-3.041] [-2.887] 
KISRANI 0.0994 0.0399 0.0617 
[1.534] [0.608] [0.868] 
Location [Nairobi or 
Mombasa -0.5844* -0.650* 
[-2.435] [-2.504] 
Nakuru -0.3010 -0.4534 
[-1.057] [-1.405] 
Eldoret -1.509* -1.8907* 
[-3.680] [-3.904] 
Sectors [agro-processing is the omitted sector] 
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Log likelihood ratio 
Constant 
M
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s 
W
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orking firm
s 
Textile firm
s 
Plastics firm
s 
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s 
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orking firm
s 
Construction firm
s 
Chem
ical fim
is 
Bakeries 
£ GJ 
-145.515 
-0.4526* 
[-2.844] 
-130.840 
-0.0949 
[-0.511] 
£ I>J 
-125.489 
-0.1967 
[-0.747] 
0.6567 
[1.402] 
0.8886* 
[2.019] 
0.1866 
[0.617] 
-0.1821 
[-0.379] 
0.4405 
[0.953] 
-0.1823 
[-0.562] 
1.0121* 
[2.401] 
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Conclusions 
For some time now, it has been acknowledged that Kenya suffers 
from widespread corruption. Although the government has been 
fighting the vice and has legislated accordingly, such fight has 
not benefited from hard evidence about those who bear the brunt 
of the vice or even how exposure to corruption is structured. 
There has also been very little clear evidence of the retrogressive 
consequences of corruption. 
Using firm-level data, we have demonstrated that, although not 
all manufacturing firms in Kenya receive government contracts, 
those that are lucky to receive such contracts pay an average of 
14.2% of the total contract value in kick-backs to public servants. 
There are huge sector differences around this mean, with the 
construction materials and the paper and printing sectors paying 
more than 25% of the contract value on government contracts 
as kick-back. The average expenditure on unofficial payments is 
7.5% of annual sales. This is only a little lower than expenditure 
of allowances and adds to the cost borne by firm through theft, 
vandalism and arson. 
There are also important firm size and location differences in the 
exposure to corruption. Firms based in Nairobi and Nakuru are 
more exposed than those based elsewhere. Similarly, the small 
and medium sized firms are more exposed than the very small 
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and very large ones, so that the firm size and exposure-to-
corruption relationship has an inverted 'U ' shape. 
The results show that the characterisation of corruption remains 
a non-trial task, but that in any case there is strong positive 
association between exposure to corruption and incompleteness 
in tax reporting, number of politicians closely known and red tape. 
Firms that report only a small percentage of their revenues for 
tax returns pay more on bribery, so that incomplete tax returns 
open a doorway for extraction of bribery, challenging the wisdom 
of under-reporting of tax obligations. The results also reveal that 
firms that pay bribery also face red tape, shattering the greasing 
function and efficiency theories of corruption. Corruption in the 
Kenyan context does not fast-track public services. 
More significantly, corruption reduces the ability of firms to grow 
and penetrate external markets. Although Kenya has many export 
platforms mounted in the last 15 years, such platforms are unlikely 
to have outcomes that are true to their breed due to corruption. 
Reducing the incidence of corruption is likely to have a higher 
payoff than any of the platforms currently found in Kenya. 
Corruption also denies Kenya the development potential 
associated with firm growth. Although development thinking is 
shifting considerable responsibility to private enterprise, the 
potential development dynamism of private enterprise in Kenya 
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is pitted against systemic corruption, so that the private enterprises' 
development outcome is constricted. We conclude that corruption 
in Kenya reduces returns to investment and investment rate, 
employment and wealth creation opportunities. 
These firm-level findings add to the burgeoning literature 
demonstrating the retrogressive consequences of corruption, and 
provide further reason for intensifying the fight against the vice. 
That fight must however target specific sectors and locations. 
Additionally, there is policy value in continuing to rationalise the 
number of licenses needed to operate in Kenya and explore ways 
of dismantling bureaucratic discretion and control rights. Issuance 
of l icences should continue to be decentral ised so that 
businesspersons can procure these across the counter along with 
other services such as postal services. This should be the ultimate 
goal of decentralization of public services. 
The programme of privatisation of state corporations and utility 
companies should be sustained to create further opportunities 
for expanding services, ameliorating capacity restrictions, service 
stretching and injecting competition in service provision. This will 
reduce artificial excess demand, and dissipate rents that are 
objects of bribery. Privatisation should also improve accountability 
and rights of ownership of state-corporation, both of which remain 
crucial in reducing corruption. 
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End Notes 
1 See Bigsten & Kimuyu (2002) 
: About the time of the survey, KIPPRA was in the process of 
launching the Kenya Private Sector Alliance that brought separate 
private sector associations under one umbrella 
3 The citizens in this context can be seen as the principals and 
politician as the agents 
4 After all, it is excessive graft and fear of the predatory state 
that pushes firms ways from the formal economy 
5 Stories abound of how in order to remain in business, 
businesspersons in Nakuru had to participate in the head of state 
's fund-raising activities to either obviate his displeasure or attract 
his favours perceived necessary for operating in Nakuru. 
6 Fisman and Svensson (2000) argue and demonstrate that the 
bias will be towards zero, leading to an underestimation of the 
effect of bribery on firm performance. 
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